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Immunity for Serving Heads of States for Crimes 
under International Criminal Law: 
An Analysis of the ICC-Indictment against Omar Al 
Bashir 
 
ABSTRACT  
This paper analyses head of state immunity, a traditional rule of international law, in relation 
to the indictments by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2009 against the current 
Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. It can be agreed that the doctrine of 
immunity in international law attempts to overcome the tension between the protection of 
human rights and the demands of state sovereignty. The statutes and decisions of 
international criminal courts make it clear that no immunity for international crimes shall be 
attached to heads of states or to senior government officials. However, the case against the 
Sudanese President, where the jurisdiction of the ICC was triggered by the UN Security 
Council‟s referral of the situation in Darfur to the Court, represents the first case where a 
serving head of state has, in fact, been indicted before the ICC. From this case, a number of 
legal issues have arisen; such as the questions where the ICC‟s jurisdiction over an incumbent 
head of state, not party to the ICC Statute, is justified, and the obligations upon ICC state 
parties to surrender such a head of state to the requesting international criminal court. This 
paper gives an analysis of these questions. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO PROBLEM 
 
World alert on the conflict and atrocities in Darfur, Sudan, may be greatly attributed to the 
increased widespread media coverage and reports by non-governmental organisations, during 
2003.
1
 In September 2004, the UN Security Council (SC) adopted Resolution 1564,
2
 acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This resolution requested, inter alia, for the 
establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (the Commission) by the 
United Nations Secretary-General. 
 
In October 2004, the Secretary-General appointed a five member body of the Commission.
3
  
The Commission was assembled in Geneva and began its work on 25 October 2004, and 
submitted its report within three months of its appointment. Based upon the report of the 
Commission
4
 the SC referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC),
5
 in terms of Resolution 1593.
6
   
                                                          
1
 Amnesty International Report (2003) „Sudan: Empty Promises? Human Rights Violations in Government-
Controlled Areas‟ African Report No. 54/036/2003 available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/036/2003/en/1625d4b3-d6dc-11dd-ab95-
a13b602c0642/afr540362003en.pdf  (accessed 24 March 2011); International Crises Group (2003) „Sudan: 
Towards an Incomplete Peace‟ African Report No. 73, available at  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/073-sudan-towards-an-incomplete-peace.aspx 
(accessed on 24 March 2011). 
2
 UN Security Council Resolution S/Res/1564 (2004), 18 September 2004. 
3
 The tasks for the Commission were set out in Article 12 of Resolution 1564 (2004), “to investigate reports of 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties”; “to determine also 
whether or not acts of genocide have occurred”; and “to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view 
of ensuring that those responsible are held accountable”. 
4
 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United National Secretary-General, 25 
January 2005, available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (accessed on 23 March 2011). 
5
 See, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 12 July 1998, U.N. Doc A/CONF 
183/9. 
6
 UN Security Council Resolution S/Res/1593 (2005), 31 March 2005. 
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In July 2005, the Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, decided to open 
investigations into the situation in Darfur.
7
 Mr Ocampo stated, in his periodic report to the 
SC, that the available evidence showed a „widespread pattern of serious crimes, including 
murder, rape, the displacement of civilians, and the looting and burning of civilian property‟8 
had occurred in the Darfur region. This was followed by a list of evidence, deposited by the 
Office of the Prosecutor, to the Pre-Trial Chamber I requesting summons to appear be issued 
in respect of two suspects.
9
  The Court has issued two arrest warrants against Sudanese 
President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir). The first warrant was issued in 2009
10
 
and the second warrant in 2010.
11
 
 
The situation in Darfur has resulted in six cases before the ICC. Three suspects (including Al 
Bashir) have been issued with arrest warrants, two suspects have been summoned, and the 
case against one suspect has been closed.
12
 The Darfur situation is amongst the seven 
situations currently before the ICC since the coming into force of the ICC Statute on 1 July 
2002.
13
 
                                                          
7
 See, Press Release, The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigation in Darfur, ICC-OTP-0606-104, 6 June 2005, 
available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/press%20releases/otp%20the
%20prosecutor%20of%20the%20icc%20opens%20investigation%20in%20darfur [accessed on 23 March 2011]. 
8
 Detailed summaries of the crimes on which the prosecutor has gathered information and evidence can be found 
on the ICC‟s website, available at http://www.icc-cpi.intcases/Darfur/s0205/s0205_un.html [accessed on 23 
March 2011]. 
9
 See, Press Release, Pre-Trial Chamber I receives documents containing list of evidence in the situation in 
Darfur, ICC-CPI_20070227-207 (2005) available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/press%20releases/pre-
trial%20chamber%20i%20receives%20documents%20containing%20list%20of%20evidence%20in%20the%20
situation%20of%20darfur [accessed on 27 March 2011]. 
10
 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1, „Decision on the 
Prosecutor‟s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir‟ (4 March 2009); The 
Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-95, „Decision on the Prosecutor‟s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir‟ (12 July 2010). 
11
 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmnd Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-73, „Judgement on the Appeal 
of the Prosecutor against the Decision on the Prosecutor‟s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir‟ (3 February 2010). 
12
 See, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0205/ [accessed on 28 July 2011]. 
13
 See, All Situations, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/ 
[accessed on 25 October 2011]. 
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1.2 OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
 
The first objective of this study is to conduct an analysis of the legal issues following the 
arrest warrants issued against Al Bashir by the Pre-Trial Chamber I. This will be done by 
taking cognisance of the factual and legal background of the case against Al Bashir before the 
ICC. The focus of this study will be on the attacks and counter attacks which took place 
within the Darfur region, and the prominent peace negotiations which gave rise to the referral 
of the Darfur situation to the ICC. The second objective of this study is to identify the rules of 
international law on immunities enjoyed by state officials. In particular, the extent to which 
such immunities are applicable before international fora, such as the ICC, where it issues 
arrest warrants against an incumbent head of state not party to the ICC Statute. 
 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
 
The sovereignty of a state is not unfetted, it is in fact limited by many international rules such 
as customary law and treaty law. The doctrine of immunity, although well founded in the 
jurisprudence of international law, presents challenges where serious human rights violations 
have occurred in conflict situations, with the threat that the victim communities‟ interests are 
compromised through the award of immunity to such perpetrators. We have seen indictments 
against heads of state, such as those brought against Slobodan Milosević, by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and against Charles Taylor, by the 
Special Court for Sierra Leona (SCSL). However, in both cases these accused appeared 
before the respective tribunals as former heads of states. During the regime of the ICC, the 
indictments against Omar Al Bashir are the first of their kind, as he is a serving head of state.  
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The fact that the situation in Darfur is based on a resolution of the SC is paramount in respect 
of issues such as; the removal of immunity. Another problem relates the obligations upon 
states parties to the ICC Statute, under Article 98(1), to surrender Al Bashir to the ICC. 
Therefore, the question arises whether there is an obligation upon states parties to co-operate 
with the ICC or whether the request to surrender Al Bashir amounts to an ultra vires act by 
the ICC. The fact that the situation in Darfur is still pending before the ICC, and that Al 
Bashir is still at large (although he has made visits to several states since the issuance of 
arrest warrants against him) makes this study worth researching. Finally, this study is also 
topical for the purpose of exploring the application of the ICC Statute for the first time 
against an incumbent head of state, in respect to the ICC‟s mandate to end impunity and to 
prevent future crimes. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
This research is library-based. Primary sources will include relevant statutory documents, UN 
Reports on the situation in Darfur; Press Releases, resolutions and reports to the SC and those 
of the ICC, and cases. Secondary sources will consist of academic publications including, 
books, journal articles, legal scholar‟s commentary, as well as newspaper reports specifically 
in relation to the situation in Darfur and those addressing the issue of head of state immunity. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 
DARFUR CONFLICT 
 
2.1 THE SUDAN 
 
In order to understand the situation in Darfur, it is important to place it within its broader 
context. This normally entails a broad assessment of the situation into three phases of 
development, namely; pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Sudan. However, an 
examination of the first two phases will not be conducted in the present study. The Sudan is 
situated in northeastern Africa. With an estimated population of 43 million inhabitants, Sudan 
is considered at Low Human Development (and it ranked 154 in the 2010 United Nations 
Development Programme‟s Human Development Index).14 
 
After thirty-nine years of foreign control, under British-Egyptian rule, Sudan became 
independent on 1 January 1965.
15
 Its colonial legacy entrenched the state apparatus in 
Northern Sudan.
16
 Throughout the country development was uneven and the South was 
treated as a closed district, with Southerners having little voice in the running of the 
country.
17
 
 
                                                          
14
 UNDP Human Development Index 2010 – 20th Anniversary Edition „The Real Wealth of Nations Pathways to 
Human Development‟, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf 
[accessed on 5 June 2011]. 
15
 Niblock T (1987) Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985 11; Johnson D 
H (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars 21; Kabalo S A (1988) „Economic Crisis and The Civilian, 
Military Interchange in The Sudan‟ in Mahmoud F B (ed) Calamity in Sudan: Civilian Versus Military Rule 21.  
16
 Field S „The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry‟ (200) Institute for Global Dialogue Occasional 
Paper No. 23, 3. 
17
 Ibid; Niblock T (1987) Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985 153 and 
154; Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror 175.  
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Sudan has had ten years of democracy during the periods of 1956-1958, 1965-1969, and 
1985-1989, during its forty-six years under national rule.
18
 In the remaining periods, the 
country has been ruled by military regimes.
19
  
 
In November 1958 General Ibrahim Abboud came to power through a coup.
20
 The military 
government continued a policy of Arabization and Islamization.
21
 The continued repression 
by government throughout the country led to unrest and the emergence of armed rebellion in 
the South.
22
 In 1964 student protests and unions strikes in Khartoum forced the military 
regime out of office, this period is said to mark the beginning of Sudan‟s first civil war.23 
 
The 1965 coalition government, led by Mohmmed Ahmed Mahjub of the Umma Party (UP), 
was overthrown in May 1969 when Colonel Gaafar Mohamed Al-Nimeiri took power.
24
 The 
Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) was formed and declared as the sole legitimate party, and its 
socialist ideology later infused with political Islam.
25
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror 172-173. 
19
 Ali T & Matthews R (1999) „Civil War and Efforts in Sudan‟ in Ali T & Matthews R Civil Wars in Africa 
(1999) 193. 
20
 Deng F M (1995) War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan 57-58; Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and 
Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror 179-180. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Deng F M (1995) War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan 57-58.     
23
 Mansour K (1990) The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan’s Political Evolution 199. 
Beshir M O (1975) The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace 49-53; Kabalo S A (1988) „Economic Crisis 
and The Civilian, Military Interchange in The Sudan‟ in Mahmoud F B (ed) Calamity in Sudan: Civilian Versus 
Military Rule 26-28; Ali T & Matthews R (1999) „Civil War and Efforts in Sudan‟ in Ali T & Matthews R Civil 
Wars in Africa 205-206; Johnson D H (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars 30-31; Mamdani M 
(2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror 180. 
24
 Woodward P (2003) The Horn of Africa: Political and International Relations 38-42. 
25
 Gresh A (1989) „The Officers and the Comrades: The Sudanese Communist Party and Nimeiri Face-to-Face, 
1969-1971‟ 21 International Journal of Middle East Studies 393-394; Burr J M & Collins R O (2008) Darfur: 
The Long Road to Disaster (2ed.) 71; Beshir M O (1975) The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace 72; 
Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror 190. 
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On 27 February 1972 the so-called Addis Ababa agreement was signed between Nimeiri and 
the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), which granted the South a degree of 
autonomy and democracy.
26
 African scholars have described the agreement as a landmark in 
the history of Sudan and as important as the Treaty of Versailles was in Europe in 1919.
27
 
After oil was discovered in the South in 1979, Nimeiri took several measures to incorporate 
the oil-rich areas of the South into the North, because of the nation‟s deepening economic 
crisis.
28
 The attempt to redraw the boarders between the North and South, in order to remove 
the oilfields from Southern jurisdiction failed, and resulted in the creation of a new 
province.
29
 This was a breach of the Addis Ababa agreement.
30
 Furthermore, in September 
1983 Nimeiri introduced Islamic Sharia Law (the so-called September laws) by injecting 
religion into government policies.
31
 The South reacted with further resistance against these 
steps, and eventually civil war re-launched in 1983 by the Sudan People‟s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM), displacing four million people and killing almost two million people.
32
 
After sixteen years of oppressive rule Nimeiri‟s regime came to an end amidst protests, over 
food shortage and price increases, led by the Professionals‟ Front.33 
 
                                                          
26
 Global Security Website „Sudan: First Civil War‟, available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm [accessed on 5 June 2011]; Dagne T 
„Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement‟ (2010) 18, available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142668.pdf [accessed on 5 June 20111]; Woodward P (2003) The 
Horn of Africa: Political and International Relations  42-43.  
27
 Beshir M O (1975) The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace 107 and 122-123.  
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ali T & Matthews R (1999) „Civil War and Efforts in Sudan‟ in Ali T & Matthews R Civil Wars in Africa 
208-209; Field S „The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry‟ Institute for Global Dialogue 
Occasional Paper No. 23 (2000) 3; Johnson D H (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars 45-47; Sharif H 
(1994) „Re-Cycling the Past in the Sudan: An Overview of Political Decay‟ in Sharif H & Terje T (eds.) Short-
Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan  12; Rone J (2003) Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights  129. 
30
 Field S „The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry‟ (2000) Institute for Global Dialogue 
Occasional Paper No. 23, 3. 
31
 Johnson D H (1991) „North-South Issues‟ in Woodward P (ed.) Sudan after Nimeiri 131-137; Ali T & 
Matthews R (1999) „Civil War and Efforts in Sudan‟ in Ali T & Matthews R Civil Wars in Africa 209; Johnson 
D H (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars 71; Rona J (2003) Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights  130-132. 
32
 El-Battahani A „A Complex Web: Politics and Conflict in Sudan‟ (2006) available at http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/sudan/politics-conflict.php  [accessed on 5 June 2011]. 
33
 Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror 192-193. 
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In April 1985 a Transitional Military Council, led by General Abed Rahman Siwar Al-Dahab, 
was put in place to oversee Sudan into a multi-party democratic era.
34
 The elections in 1986 
led to the victory of UP leader, Sadiq Al-Mahdi, who became Prime Minster.
35
 The elected 
government was soon overthrown by the leaders of the Islamist coup who cited the elected 
government‟s political ineptness and failure to stop the fighting in Darfur among the reasons 
for its actions.
36
 
 
In June 1989 the current President of Sudan, General Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, came to power 
through a military coup.
37
 The Islamist regime was led by the National Islamic Front (NIF) 
and established a paramilitary organ, alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), called the 
Popular Defence Force (PDF).
38
 Its establishment caused another round of conflict. Political 
parties and trade unions were banned under emergency laws.
39
 Hallmarks of the regime 
consisted of the detention of opponents, extra-legal practices and general abuse of human 
rights.
40
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 Sidahmed A S & Sidahmed A (2005) Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East 33-34; Sharif H (1994) „Re-
Cycling the Past in the Sudan: An Overview of Political Decay‟ in Sharif H & Terje T (eds.) Short-Cut to 
Decay: The Case of the Sudan 13; Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on 
Terror 193. 
35
 Sidahmed A S & Sidahmed A (2005) Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East 33-34. 
36
 Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror 231. 
37
 Sharif H (1994) „Re-Cycling the Past in the Sudan: An Overview of Political Decay‟ in Sharif H & Terje T 
(eds.) Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan  17; Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, 
Politics, and the War on Terror 193; El-Battahani A „A Complex Web: Politics and Conflict in Sudan‟ (2006). 
38
 Salih M A M „Understanding the Conflict in Darfur‟ (2005) University of Copenhagen Centre for African 
Studies Occasional Paper, available at 
http://www.teol.ku.dk/cas/research/publications/occ._papers/muhamed_salihsamletpaper.pdf [accessed on 10 
July 2011]. 
39
 Sharif H (1994) „Re-Cycling the Past in the Sudan: An Overview of Political Decay‟ in Sharif H & Terje T 
(eds.) Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan 17.  
40
 Ibid, 18. 
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Successive regimes have been criticised for being manipulative administrations, using 
ideologies to gain support, and elites who have mastered the colonial era‟s divide-and-rule 
tactics.
41
 This resulted in under-development, exclusion, and violent conflict in Sudan.
42
 The 
failure of parliamentary systems resulted in military coups and the emergence of regional 
movements.
43
 However, the political parties who ran these systems have been complimented 
for running reasonably fair elections which earned them more respect from the press, 
judiciary and trade unions.
44
 Today the Sudan, once the largest country in Africa,
45
 has been 
divided into two states. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brought an end to 
the North-South Sudan, David and Goliath style, civil war. The January 2011 Referendum, in 
order to determine the status of the Southern Sudan, received a majority of 98.83 per cent of 
participants voting for independence led to the subsequent birth of the Republic of South 
Sudan on 9 July 2011.
46
 
 
2.2 THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR 
 
Darfur is located in the western province of Sudan and boarders with Libya, Chad, and the 
Central African Republic.
47
 Administratively it was divided into North (El Fasher), South 
(Nyala) and West (El Geneina) Darfur.
48
  
                                                          
41
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42
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43
 Salih M A M „Understanding the Conflict in Darfur‟ (2005); Ibrahim F „Ideas on the Background of the 
Present Conflict in Darfur‟ (2004), available at  
http://www.afrikafreundeskreis.de/docs/darfur_prof_ibrahim_5_04.pdf [accessed on 10 July 2011]. 
44
 Sidahmed A S & Sidahmed A (2005) Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East 35.  
45
 Collins R D (2008) A History of Modern Sudan 1; Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, 
Politics, and the War on Terror 8. 
46
 See, United Nations Mission in the Sudan „Independence of South Sudan‟ available at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/referendum.shtml [accessed on 5 August 2011]. “The 
referendum was initiated in 2005 through the CPA between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM, which 
ended a war of over twenty years. Sudanese authorities were responsible for the process, led by President Al 
Bashir of Sudan and President Salva Kiir Mayardit of the Southern Sudan, under the leadership of the [SC]”. 
47
 Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror 8. 
48
 Salih M A M „Understanding the Conflict in Darfur‟ (2005); Ibrahim F „Ideas on the Background of the 
Present Conflict in Darfur‟ (2004). 
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It is habited by tribal groups (predominantly agriculturalist and sedentary) whose distinctions 
are not clear-cut, and “are more a product of war than the cause of it.”49 Islam is a sheared 
religion amongst all tribes, and although some tribes have their own languages, Arabic is 
commonly spoken.
50
 
 
Mohamed M A Salih contends that Sudan‟s independence gave rise to at least three sets of 
relationships with respect Darfur: “(i) the development of new alliances because of the ethnic 
background of political parties; (ii) the fight for resources intensified because of human and 
lifestock population; drought; competition over land, water points and grazing resources; and 
(iii) the UP‟s control of western Sudanese votes were increasingly challenged by Darfur-
based movements.”51 
 
The main rebel groups in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), started organising themselves during 2001 and 
2002.
52
 Their members were drawn from local village defence groups, and essentially derived 
from three tribes: the Fur, the Massalit and the Zaghawa.
53
 The SLM/A, which was formally 
known as the Darfur Liberation Front, focused its agenda on the people of Darfur and it later 
covered all of Sudan.
54
 The agenda of the JEM was based on a type of manifesto called the 
Black Book of 2001 – which documents the dominance of northern tribes in Sudan‟s 
                                                          
49
 Suliman M „Ethnicity from Perception to Cause of Violent Conflicts: The Case of the Fur and Nuba Conflicts 
in Western Sudan‟ (1997), available at http://www.ifaanet.org/ethnicity_inversion.htm [accessed on 10 July 
2011]. 
50
 Sharif H (1994) „Re-Cycling the Past in the Sudan: An Overview of Political Decay‟ in Sharif H & Terje T 
(eds.) Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan 18; Ibrahim F „Ideas on the Background of the Present 
Conflict in Darfur‟ (2004). 
51
 Salih M A M „Understanding the Conflict in Darfur‟ (2005); Ibrahim F „Ideas on the Background of the 
Present Conflict in Darfur‟ (2004). 
52
 Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror 254. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 See, Press Release, Commentary by SLM/A, 14 March 2003, available at 
http://www.sudan.net/news/press/postedr/214.shtml [accessed on 11 July 2011]. 
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government – and sought to prove the disparities in the distribution of power and wealth.55 
Both rebel groups cited socio-economic and political marginalisation of Darfur and its people 
as reason for their opposition to the Khartoum government.
56
 The Darfur conflict began as a 
civil war (1987-1989) between local militia, each with ethnic identity.
57
  It is suggested that 
the government only became involved after 1989, following its failed initiatives to address 
the basic causes of the conflict.
58
 In March 2003 the insurgents attacked government 
installations in Kutum, Tine and El Fashir, by destroying military aircraft, killing soldiers and 
police, and looting government weaponry in order to strengthen their position.
59
  
 
As a result of military deficit in Darfur the government of Sudan called upon local tribes to 
assist, alongside the PDF, in the fight against the rebels.
60
 Mostly Arab (from the Misseriya 
and Rizeigat) nomadic tribes responded to the government‟s call.61 Reports indicated that 
foreigners, primarily from Chad and Libya, also responded to this call and that the 
government of Sudan was prepared to recruit them.
62
 These new recruits became known by 
the civilian population as the “Janjaweed”.  
 
 
                                                          
55
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The term janjaweed is defined as: 
 
“[A] generic term to describe Arab militias acting, under the authority, with the support, 
complicity or tolerance of the Sudanese State authorities, and who benefit from impunity 
for their actions”.63 
 
As already been pointed out, that the janjaweed were enlisted by the Sudanese government as 
a counterinsurgency force due to a lack of its own military resources.  
Towards the end of 2003, the janjaweed shifted the focus of their campaign away from the 
rebels and targeted civilians.
64
 A typical assault on a village was initiated by helicopter 
bombings, this was followed by the janjaweed entering the villages on foot or camels and 
horses or pickups to loot, rape, and kill civilians.
65
 Villages were often burned down to 
prevent return.
66
  
 
World alert to the conflict in Darfur may be greatly attributed to the increased widespread 
media coverage and reports by non-governmental organisations during 2003.
67
 Political 
response gained momentum in 2004 when US Secretary of States Colin Powell declared the 
violence in Darfur as genocide for the first time.
68
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64
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Defence Research Agency Report (2008), available at http://www.foi.se/upload/projects/Africa/foir2559.pdf 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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 See, Sudanese Human Rights Organisation (2004) „Report on the situation of Human Rights in Sudan, 1 
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Controlled Areas‟ (2003); Smith J and Walker B (2004) „Darfur: Management of a Genocidal Crisis‟ AEGIS 
Report 201/04, available at  http://www.wagingpeace.info/documents/Darfur_Summary_Report.pdf [accessed 
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73; Human Rights Watch (2004) „Sudan, Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in western Sudan‟  Vol. 16, No. 5 (a), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudan0404.pdf [accessed on 11 July 2011]; Human 
Rights Watch (2004) „Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western 
Sudan‟ Vol 16, No. 6 (a), available at  http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudan0504full.pdf 
[accessed on 11 July 2011]. 
68
 See, Genocide Watch „Genocide Emergency: Darfur, Sudan‟ (2004), available at 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/12waystodenygenocide.html [accessed on 1 August 2011]. 
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The SC condemned the attacks in the Darfur region
69
 together with the call to save Darfur.
70
 
The World Health Organisation estimated 118,142 dead between September 2003 and 
January 2005.
71
 Another estimate was that of John Holmes, under Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs, it suggested 200,000 people dead as a result of the combined effect of 
the conflict.
72
  In November 2004 the Office of the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) reported 203,051 internally displaced persons from Darfur in 11 camps 
along the border of Sudan and others living as refugees in eastern Chad.
73
 In contrast, the 
Commissioner-General of the Government Humanitarian Aid Commission indicated that 
there were 1, 65 million internally displaced persons in 81 camps and safe area during the 
beginning of the same month.
74
  
 
It is worthy to note that, as early as August 2003, efforts were made to find a political 
solution to end the conflict. On 3 September 2003, in Abéché, with the backing of President 
Idriss Déby of Chad, the government representatives and the SLM/A signed a Ceasefire 
Agreement which envisaged cessation of hostilities for a renewable 45-day period.
75
 
Subsequent rounds of talks took place and on the 8 April 2004 the government of Sudan and 
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the SLM/A and the JEM signed a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.
76
 On the 28 May 2004 
the parties signed an agreement on ceasefire modalities.
77
  
 
 
The African Union (AU) became actively involved in mediating peace talks which took place 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and in Abuja, Nigeria. The mission in Darfur was the AU‟s second 
and largest and most complex initiative.
78
 On the 9 November 2004, the government 
representatives, the SLM/A and the JEM signed two Protocols, one on the Improvement of 
the Humanitarian Situation
79
 and the other on the Enhancement of the Security Situation
80
 in 
Darfur.  
 
Apart from the political negotiations, the AU played a key role through the African Mission 
in Sudan. However, the scope of its mandate was limited to monitoring the ceasefire through 
the establishment of the AU Ceasefire Commission in Darfur, including the deployment of 
monitors.
81
 The African Mission in Sudan faced several operational challenges
82
 which led to 
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its close liaison with the United Nations Mission in Sudan in terms of the SC Resolution 
1564.
83
 
 
Despite the efforts of political negotiations and the adaptation of  protocols, violations in the 
Darfur region continued between the rebels and the government forces and its militia, leading 
up to intervention by the SC in 2005. The alarming death toll in the Sudan conflict is and the 
number of its victims are said to exceed those of the Balkans, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra 
Leona, and Chechnya conflicts combined.
84
 Overall, the assumption is that all the deaths, 
whether „direct‟ or „indirect‟, are a result of violence from a single source: the government of 
Sudan.
85
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CHAPTER THREE:   
ISSUES RELATING TO SECURITY COUNCIL 
REFERRAL, JURISDICTION AND ARREST 
WARRANTS AGAINST AL BASHIR  
 
3.1 SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRAL OF THE DARFUR SITUATION 
 
Not surprisingly, the powers of the SC to refer a situation to the ICC has been heavily 
criticised by both ICC states parties and academics. This section of the chapter deals with 
these issues by discussing: (i) the factual background against which the Darfur situation was 
referred to the ICC, (ii) the legal basis upon which the SC may exercise these powers, and 
(iii) the legal consequences which arise when the ICC exercises jurisdiction over a situation, 
owing to the referral by the SC. 
 
3.1.1 Security Council Resolution referring the situation in Darfur  
 
It is important to note that the SC, in its resolution 1556, emphasized the need to bring to 
justice the leaders and their associates who incited and carried out human rights and 
international humanitarian law violations in Darfur.
86
  The parties to the conflict also insisted 
on the principle of accountability, in that they “[stressed] the need to restore and uphold the 
rule of law, including investigating all cases of human rights violations and bringing to 
justice those responsible, in line with the AU‟s expressed commitment to fight impunity.”87     
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In September 2004 the SC, pursuant to Resolution 1564, requested the UN Secretary-General 
to establish the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (the Commission).
88
  A month 
later the Secretary-General appointed a five member body of the Commission.
89
 The tasks of 
the Commission were: 
 
“to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law 
in Darfur by all parties”; “to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have 
occurred”; and “to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view of ensuring that 
those responsible are held accountable”. 90 
 
 
In February 2005, three months after completing its mandate, the Commission submitted its 
report to the SC.
91
  In its report the Commission found that the attacks by government forces 
and the janjaweed on civilians (mostly belonging to the Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa tribes) 
amounted to “large – scale war crimes,” and that the mass killing of civilians by government 
forces and the janjaweed were piloted in “both a widespread and systematic manner,” 
therefore, likely to amount to a crime against humanity.
92
 The Commission established that 
“rape and other forms of sexual violence committed by the janjaweed and Government 
soldiers in Darfur was widespread and systematic and may thus well amount to a crime 
against humanity”, and that this applied to the crime of sexual slavery.93  More importantly, 
the Commission noted that while the rebel groups were responsible for attacks on civilians, 
which amounted to war crimes, it found no evidence suggesting that these attacks were 
widespread or systematic.
94
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Of great significance is the Commissions finding with regard to mechanisms for ensuring 
accountability for the crimes committed in Darfur. The Commission was of the opinion that 
the “Sudanese courts are unable and unwilling to prosecute and try the alleged offenders [and 
that] [o]ther mechanisms are needed to do justice.”95 Max Du Plessis correctly stated that this 
is no small finding, because it denies the Sudanese government the opportunity to rely upon 
the complementarity principle contained in the ICC Statute to avert that it is willing to 
prosecute the offenders.
96
   
 
The Commission finally recommended for the referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC by 
the SC in order “to protect the civilians of Darfur and end the rampant impunity...prevailing 
there.”97  In addition to this, it endorsed the ICC as the “only credible way of bringing alleged 
perpetrators to justice.”98 Indeed this evaluation holds true today, owing to Sudan‟s failure to 
prosecute the offenders itself.   
 
One of the practical limitations faced by the Commission may be discerned from the 
language of its founding instrument, namely Resolution 1564. First, its mandate was only in 
regard to the situation in Darfur, thereby excluding the conflict in the south and other regions 
of Sudan. Secondly, the time-frame of its investigations were only in respect of events from 
the beginning of 2003 up to the completion of its mandate. This proposition was impractical, 
taking into cognisance that the conflict in the Darfur was intrinsically intertwined with 
conflicts throughout the country, therefore, could not be viewed in isolation. 
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Two months after receiving the Commission‟s report, the SC, acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, referred the Darfur situation since the 1 July 2002 to the ICC and urged all states 
to co-operate with the Court.
99
  The resolution invited the ICC and AU to discuss the 
practicalities of proceedings relating to the conflict,
100
 while also emphasising the importance 
of healing and reconciliation, for example, through the creation of truth and/or reconciliation 
commissions.
101
   
 
The resolution was adopted by eleven votes to none against and four abstentions by Algeria, 
Brazil, China and the United States.
102
  The Algerian representative preferred an AU solution 
to this delicate problem, because it could provide peace and satisfy the need for justice.
103
  
The Chinese representative disagreed with the referral to the ICC without the consent of 
Sudan and preferred that the perpetrators to be tried in Sudan.
104
  The United States (U.S.) 
representative express her delegations long-standing objections and concerns regarding the 
ICC‟s jurisdiction over national of non-party states, however, it believed that  a hybrid 
tribunal in Africa would have been a better mechanism in order to end the climate of 
impunity in Darfur.
105
  Brazil agreed with the resolution but objected to paragraph 6, which 
recognised the ICC‟s exclusive jurisdiction.106  
 
One of the issues concerning the SC‟s referral power is that it can enhance the ICC‟s 
jurisdictional reach to situations involving non-party states.
107
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U.S Ambassador Anne W Patterson, during her explanation of the U.S. vote, remarked on 
paragraph 6 of the resolution, which reads as follows: 
 
“Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State 
outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or 
omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the 
Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived 
by that contributing State[.]” 
 
She opined that the language of these paragraphs provides protection to the U.S and other 
states and as such is precedent-setting by acknowledging the concerns of states not party to 
the ICC Statute and recognising that persons from these states should not be susceptible to 
investigation or prosecution by the ICC.
108
  Therefore, according to Patterson, in the future 
where there is no consent by the state involved, any investigation or prosecution by the ICC 
over nationals of non-party states may “only” be envisaged where there is a decision by the 
SC.
109
  Another important remark was that the U.S was satisfied that the resolution 
recognized that the UN will not bear any of the expenses incurred in connection with the 
referral.
110
  This position is not surprising as it is conceivable that a state not party to the ICC 
Statute would not desire to make financial contributions with respect to investigations and 
prosecutions before a Court which it does not endorse.  
 
John Crook observes that the President Bush‟s administration had long pressed for strong 
international response to the brutal attacks on civilians in Darfur and western Sudan, it was 
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the first country to publicly characterise the events as genocide, and it was instrumental in the 
creation of the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the events in Darfur.
111
    
 
However, the U.S. vigorously opposed the ICC contending that the Court could bring 
unwarranted and politically motivated charges against U.S. troops and officials.
112
  Crook 
suggests that this is why in late January 2005, before the submission of the Commission‟s 
report to the SC, the U.S proposed creating a new court at the headquarters of the existing 
ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, to be jointly administered by the UN and AU.
113
  According to 
newspaper reports, the U.S. proposal was met with strong resistance from SC members, most 
of which supported the Council‟s referral to the ICC (Britain, France, and Denmark).114  In 
addition to this, Al Bashir stated, responding to the SC referral, in a broadcast that his 
government would not surrender any Sudanese nationals to be tried in courts outside 
Sudan.
115
   
 
3.1.2 Legal basis  
 
The ICC established under the ICC Statue
116
 is the first „permanent‟ international court with 
the power to try individuals [my emphasis] accused of serious crimes of international 
concern.
117
 Proceedings before the ICC may be invoked by one of the three so-called trigger 
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mechanisms.
118
 Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute grants the SC express power to refer cases to 
the Prosecutor of the ICC in a “situation in which one or many of such crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court appears to have been committed.” However, as Berman suggests, the 
effectiveness of the ICC will to a large extent depend upon its relationship with the SC.
119
  
 
Two sources of law govern this relationship. First is the UN-ICC Relationship Agreement,
120
 
and the second is the constituent treaties of the UN and the ICC, namely; the UN Charter and 
the ICC Statute respectively.
121
 However, the ICC is not a UN organ.
122
 This relationship is 
complicated because the Court‟s decisions may involve issues of high political sensitivity.123 
Further tension may develop due to differing mandates which the two institutions seek to 
achieve.
124
 The ICC mandate is fairly clear; the achievement of justice by means of an 
international criminal process.
125
 The SC‟s objective is the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security, which may include the achievement of justice in a particular 
case.
126
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However, as pointed out by Max du Plessis with respect to the mandate of the ICC, “there is 
no irrebuttable presumption in favour of prosecutions” under the ICC Statute.127 
 
3.1.3 Controversial issues relating to the Security Council’s referral powers 
 
Some observations may be made in respect to the legal issues that flow from this 
controversial exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. 
 
First, a referral by the SC must be within the context of a Chapter VII resolution.
128
 An 
adoption of a Chapter VII resolution requires the SC to make an Article 39 determination that 
a situation constitutes a “threat to, or breach of, the peace or an act of aggression.”129 Put 
differently, the SC must determine that in a particular situation it is necessary to take 
measures which would restore or maintain international peace and security.
130
 This links the 
SC‟s mandate of peace and security to the ICC‟s justice mandate.131  
 
Secondly, it seems that this mechanism grants the ICC jurisdiction regardless of the 
perpetrators nationality and location of the crime, therefore, it particularly caters for crimes 
committed on the territory of UN non-member states.
132
 Therefore, the SC‟s referral power 
can enhance the jurisdictional reach of the ICC to situations involving non-party states, a 
jurisdiction that would not exist had it not been for such a referral.
133
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Thirdly, the jurisdiction exercised by the ICC in terms of Article 13(1) is its own and not 
some jurisdiction which has been transferred to the Court by the SC.
134
 This observation is 
accurate because the SC does not possess any criminal jurisdiction of its own which it could 
pass to the ICC.
135
 
 
Finally, the SC‟s referral competence is limited in respect of a „situation‟ only and not an 
individual case. Whereas the trigger mechanism by the Prosecutor of the ICC is more 
narrower in terms of a „specific crime‟ hence its referral may not be the result of an 
investigation of a general „situation‟.136 This position may be seen as reflecting the general 
concern by the ICC states parties to not give the Prosecutor wide powers, while also to not 
allow the SC to refer an individual case of criminal activity.
137
 However, the SC is not 
prohibited from deciding, under the UN Charter, to refer a particular case of criminal activity 
to the ICC in order to maintain peace.
138
 
 
In the final analysis, it should be highlighted that the ICC Statute accords no special treatment 
to a SC referral as opposed to the other two ways in which a case may be brought before the 
Court.
139
 Therefore, a referral by the SC does not necessarily mean that there will be actual 
prosecution of a case by the Prosecutor, due to the independence and impartiality enjoyed by 
ICC organs.
140
 In this regard, the Prosecutor has discretion when deciding whether to proceed 
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with an investigation or prosecution in a particular case.
141
 This competence applies even in 
respect of a referral by the SC.
142
 
 
While the SC may want to ensure the effectiveness of its determination, for example, by 
creating ad hoc tribunals, such a practice would undermine the establishment of the ICC.
143
 
Moreover, a referral to the ICC could be financially feasible and more appropriate in other 
situations. This argument was raised by the Commission when it considered in favour for a 
referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC.
144
 
 
3.2 JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 
 
3.2.1  The jurisdiction of the ICC over nationals of non-party states 
 
The ICC Statute provides for three circumstances in terms of which the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states. First, the ICC may found jurisdiction over such 
individuals in situations referred to the ICC Prosecutor by the SC.
145
 Secondly, where such 
individuals have committed a crime on the territory of a state which is party to the ICC 
Statute or has otherwise accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in respect to that crime.
146
 
Thirdly, where the non-party state has given consent to the ICC‟s jurisdiction in a particular 
case.
147
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Notably, in the first two circumstances the consent of the state of nationality is a requirement 
in the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.
148
 
 
The U.S. has vigorously argued that the exercise of jurisdiction over nationals of non-parties 
without the consent of the non-party state would be contrary to international law.
149
 This 
argument is described as the “principal American legal objection” to the ICC.150 David J 
Scheffer suggests a basis for the U.S. position is that it is “untenable to expose the largest 
deployed military force in the world…to the jurisdiction of a criminal court that the U.S. 
government has not yet joined and whose authority over American citizens the U.S. does not 
yet recognise.‟”  
 
The long standing views of the China and the U.S. against the jurisdiction of the ICC are well 
known. Be this as it may, both states failed to practically manifest their views by exercising 
their veto power, as UN permanent member states, against the referral of the Darfur situation 
to the ICC.
151
 
 
3.2.2 Delegations of criminal jurisdiction to international courts: principles and 
precedents 
 
The question that arises here: is whether states may lawfully delegate criminal jurisdiction to 
international fora such as the ICC? 
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Madeline Morris argues that a delegation to an international criminal tribunal would be 
impermissible because the consequences are fundamentally different when carried out by an 
international court as opposed to a national court.
152
 Dapo Akande expands on this point by 
stating that the prestige of international courts and the embarrassment from their adverse 
decision are reasons why states may not wish to have cases involving their nationals or 
interests heard by international courts, however, this does not of itself mean that the they 
have no legal competence to act.
153
 
 
(a) The Nuremberg Tribunal 
 
Michael Scharf opines that the Nuremberg Tribunal, established to prosecute the Nazi leaders 
after World War II, was a collective exercise of universal jurisdiction by a treaty-based 
international court and as such constitutes a precedent for the ICC.
154
 However, Morris 
argues that while the Tribunal is an example of a delegation of criminal jurisdiction by states 
to an international tribunal, the Allied States were exercising sovereign powers in Germany at 
the time and, therefore, the Tribunal was founded upon the consent of the state of 
nationality.
155
 These arguments reflect a lack of consensus as to whether the Nuremberg 
Tribunal may be relied upon as precedent-setting for a delegation of criminal jurisdiction to 
an international tribunal without the state of nationality‟s consent.156  
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(b) The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda 
(ICTR) were created by SC resolutions under Article 25 of the UN Charter.
157
 When the SC 
acts in terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it exercises powers delegated to it by member 
states collectively.
158
 Therefore, the ICTY and the ICTR are examples of delegation of 
criminal jurisdiction by states to international tribunals.
159
  
 
The question of the Tribunals authority over nationals of non-members was raised in 1999, 
when the ICTY issued indictments for the then Presidents of the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), Slobodan Milosević and four other senior officials in relation to the 
crimes committed in Kosovo.
160
 In Prosecutor v Milutinović, Ojdamić, Sainović an ICTY 
Trial Chamber held that despite the decisions of the UN organs, the FRY was at all material 
times a UN member.
161
 There are three reasons why the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICTY 
over FRY nationals provides precedence for the exercise of jurisdiction by an international 
tribunal that is treaty-based over nationals of a state that was not party to that treaty and 
without the consent of that state.
162
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First, the FRY was not a member of the UN after the dissolution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), therefore, the FRY was not a UN member between 1992 
and 2000.
163
 Secondly, in its decision the Chamber stated that “a crime committed by any 
person, whatever his nationality, in a country that is part of the SFRY, is triable by the 
Tribunal.”164 Thirdly, many states, including the U.S., that supported the ICTY‟s jurisdiction 
over FRY nationals,
165
 did not regard the FRY as a UN member.
166
 These arguments seem to 
support the SC‟s competence to provide for jurisdiction over nationals who commit crimes on 
the territory of a state that was a UN member.
167
 Therefore, similar to the position of the ICC, 
as long as there is territorial jurisdiction, the question of nationality is irrelevant.
168
 
 
(c) The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was created under a treaty between the UN and 
Sierra Leone for the prosecution of individuals who committed serious international crimes in 
Sierra Leone.
169
 The jurisdiction of the Court is not limited to nationals of Sierra Leone. In 
fact the Court indicted a non-national: the former head of state of Liberia, Charles Taylor, for 
his participation in armed conflict in Sierra Leone.
170
 Although Liberia has instituted 
proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arguing that the indictment and 
arrest warrants do not respect the immunity enjoyed by heads of states, it has not argues that 
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the Sierra Leone is not able to delegate its criminal jurisdiction to an international court.
171
 
On the contrary the Court has received strong support the U.S. and the international 
community
172
 and is a significant example of what the US contends that parties to the ICC 
cannot lawfully do.
173
 
 
These cases provide historical precedent on the practice of states delegating their criminal 
jurisdiction over non-nationals to international tribunals, in circumstances where the state of 
nationality‟s consent was not sought. This principle finds equal application to the ICC. Where 
states have acted collectively, by lawfully delegating their criminal jurisdiction to the Court, 
in order to protect the interests of the international community. 
 
3.2.3 Limitations on ICC jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states 
 
 It has already been established that the ICC has jurisdiction over nationals of non-party state, 
despite this fact, the ICC Statute limits the Court‟s jurisdiction in specific circumstances. 
 
First, state officials may not rely on international law immunities in order to escape the 
jurisdiction of the ICC in terms of Article 27 of the ICC Statute. This provision is limited by 
Article 98(1), in that states parties to the ICC Statute are prevented from arresting and 
surrendering officials of non-party states to the ICC. This limitation is discussed in more 
detail in paragraphs 4.2.2 and 4.3.1. 
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Secondly, certain treaties may prevent the surrender of a non-party national, who is present 
on the territory of an ICC state party, to the ICC.
174
 Article 98(2) allows states parties, on 
whose territory a person wanted by the ICC is present, to fulfil their obligations under 
international agreements preventing the transfer of such person to the ICC.  
 
Thirdly, the Prosecutor of the ICC may not commence or proceed with an investigation or 
prosecution where the SC has requested a deferral of a situation.
175
 This provision was 
inserted as a means of providing limited political control over the work of the Prosecutor, as 
it was acknowledged that there may be circumstances where the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the ICC would interfere with on-going conflict resolution by the SC.
176
 
 
Fourthly, the complementarity provisions of the ICC Statute serve to limit its jurisdiction, in 
that, the ICC may not exercise its jurisdiction in cases where a state is willing to, or has 
genuinely and in good faith, investigated or prosecuted a person in respect of the same crime 
before the Court.
177
 Therefore, the jurisdiction of the ICC is supplementary to that of national 
courts and it may not be exercised where such national courts function properly.
178
 How does 
this principle apply to cases involving non-party states such as Sudan? Article 17 of the ICC 
Statute makes reference to a “State which has jurisdiction over” the case, this would include 
non-party states because they may have jurisdiction according to the traditional principles of 
jurisdiction; nationality or territoriality.
179
 On this basis it becomes clear that Sudan missed 
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the opportunity of frustrating the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC by asserting both 
willingness and ability to prosecute its nationals under its domestic judicial system. 
 
Finally, the ICC‟s competence to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states 
arises in cases of extradition obligations. States parties to the ICC Statute have an obligation 
to arrest and surrender persons on their territory to ICC when such a request is made by the 
Court.
180
 Where there are competing requests for extradition between a non-party state (in 
respect of its national) and the ICC, the state party with custody is only obliged to give 
priority to the ICC surrender request if there is no extradite treaty with the non-party state.
181
  
If there is no extradition treaty requiring the surrender of the accused to the non-party state, 
then the state party has the right to choose whether to surrender the national to the ICC or to 
the non-party state.
182
 
 
While the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over nationals of non-party states may be 
considered as politically unacceptable by non-party states (like Sudan), it is a desirable way 
of ending the culture of impunity where there has been violations of international human 
rights and international humanitarian law, as we have seen unfold in the Darfur region.  
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3.3 ARREST WARRANTS AGAINST AL BASHIR 
 
Based upon the report of the Commission the SC referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC 
Prosecutor, in terms of resolution 1593,
183
 which was subsequently welcomed by the 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan.
184
 Prior to opening investigations the Prosecutor considered 
multiple sources of information in his analysis, including the report of the Commission.
185
 
After a thorough analysis of this information, the Prosecutor concluded that the statutory 
requirements for initiating an investigation were satisfied, and thereafter opened 
investigations into the situation in Darfur on 1 June 2005.
186
 
 
On 14 July 2008, the Prosecutor filed an ex parte application under Article 58 of the ICC 
Statute (the Prosecution Application), to Pre-Trial Chamber I, requesting the issuance of an 
arrest warrant against Al Bashir.
187
 The Prosecution Application were for Al Bashir‟s 
“alleged criminal responsibility in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes against members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups in Darfur from 31 
March 2003 to 14 July 2008.”188 In his application, the Prosecutor also submitted that issuing 
a summons to appear could have been a viable alternative had Al Bashir shown a willingness 
to appear before the Court.
189
 
 
 
                                                          
183
 See, S/Res/1593, para. 1. 
184
 See, Press Release, Secretary-General Welcomes Adoption of Security Council Resolution Referring 
Situation in Darfur, Sudan, To International Criminal Court Prosecutor, SG/SM/9797AFR/1123 (2005), 
available at http://www.un.org/NEWS/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9797.doc.htm [accessed on 25 March 2011]. 
185
 See, Press Release, The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigation in Darfur, ICC-OTP-0606-104, 1 June 
(2005). 
186
 Ibid. 
187
 Public redacted version of the Prosecutor‟s Application under Article 58, ICC-02/05-157-AnxA, 14 July 
2008. 
188
 The Prosecution Application, para. 413. 
189
 The Prosecution Application, para. 414. 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
3.3.1 First arrest warrant issued by Pre-Trial Chamber I 
 
(a) Jurisdiction of the Court 
The Pre-Trial Chamber I maintained that it has jurisdiction ratione materiae insofar as the 
conduct “gives rise to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.”190 In relation to 
the jurisdiction ratione personae, the Chamber considered that the case fell within its 
jurisdiction, insofar as the Darfur situation was referred to it by the SC acting pursuant to 
Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute.
191
 This was despite of the fact that the case “refer[ed] to 
criminal liability of a State that is not party to the Statute, for crimes which were allegedly 
committed in the territory of a State not party to the Statute.”192  
 
(b) Admissibility Test 
The Chamber noted that the Prosecution Application did not raise any issues of admissibility, 
except to highlight that there were no investigations or prosecutions being conducted against 
Al Bashir for any of the crimes at national level.
193
 The Chamber declined to use its 
discretionary proprio motu power to determine the admissibility of the case against Al Bashir 
because: (i) the application was confidential; and (ii) there was no manifest factor which 
provoked it to exercise its discretion under Article 19(1) of the ICC Statute.
194
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(c) The issuance of a warrant of arrest 
In March 2009, the majority of the Chamber issued an arrest warrant against Al Bashir on the 
basis of his individual criminal responsibility under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute as an 
indirect perpetrator,
195
 or as an indirect co-perpetrator
196
 for war crimes
197
 and crimes against 
humanity.
198
 In a majority of two to one decision, the Chamber declined to include the crime 
of genocide because it found that it could not reasonably conclude that there was an existence 
of genocidal intent.
199
 Judge Anita Uăcka, dissented from this by arguing that the at the arrest 
warrant stage, the mens rea required, was that the evidence should give reasonable grounds to 
believe that there was genocidal intent.‟200 Upon assessing the Prosecutor‟s evidence, she 
found there were reasonable grounds to believe that there was existence of genocidal 
intent,
201
 and therefore, the arrest warrant should have been issued for the crime of 
genocide.
202
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3.3.2 Second arrest warrant issued by Pre-Trial Chamber I 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber‟s decision excluding the crime of genocide was appealed by the 
Prosecutor.
203
 His appeal was upheld by the Appeals Chamber where it asserted that “the 
question was not whether a person acted with genocidal intent is the only reasonable 
conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence, but whether or not there are reasonable 
grounds to believe, based on the facts, that the person committed the alleged acts with 
genocidal intent.”204 Moreover, the Chamber held that “only reasonable conclusion” criterion 
is applicable at the conviction stage and not for the purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest.‟205   
 
The Appeals Chamber held that because the Pre-Trial Chamber had erroneously applied the 
standard of proof required for issuing an arrest warrant,
206
 this procedural error had a material 
affect on the outcome of the proceedings; therefore, it reversed that facet of the decision
207
  
 
In this regard Johan D van der Vyver observes that the ICC Statute test of “reasonable 
grounds” differs from that one contained in the Statutes of the ICTY208 and ICTR,209 which 
require a “prima facie case.”210 Therefore, it is uncertain whether the ICC test requires a 
lesser degree in comparison to the Statutes of these international tribunals.
211
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On 12 July 2010 the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a second arrest warrant against Al Bashir in 
terms Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute, for the crime of genocide.
212
 The Chamber found 
that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Al Bashir acted with specific intent, as one 
of the reasonable conclusions that may be drawn from the Prosecutor‟s evidence.213 Satisfied 
with the standard of proof recognized by the Appeals Chamber, the Pre-Trial Chamber I held 
that “there were reasonable grounds to believe that Al Bashir acted with dolus 
specialis/specific intention to destroy in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups.”214  
 
The issuance of arrest warrants against Al Bashir, by the ICC, has been quite topical in 
political, professional and academic arenas. Christopher Gosnell heavily criticises, from a 
legal practitioners view, the arrest warrant request by the ICC Prosecutor as „a calculated 
strategy, using short-term expediency.‟215 According to him, a sealed arrest warrant (as 
opposed to a public one) could have increased the chances of arresting Al Bashir during his 
numerous visits to other countries, as in case of Jean-Pierre Bemba when he was taken by 
surprise in Belgium.
216
 Alternatively, the Prosecutor could have delayed requesting a public 
warrant against Al Bashir until he had secured custody and commenced a trial of at least one 
perpetrator by using a sealed warrant.
217
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The Al Bashir case has not only also exasperated the international debate about the close 
involvement of the SC and to the ICC, it has also given rise to strong opposition to the 
prosecution of African leaders for crimes under international law.
218
 Notably, the AU has 
taken a lead in its decision of non-cooperation with the ICC and its call for the SC to defer 
the proceedings in terms of Article 16 of the ICC Statute, 
219
 for a regional solution under the 
auspices of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD).
220
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
218
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 THE IMMUNITY FOR SERVING HEADS OF 
STATES FROM ICC PROSECUTION 
 
4.1 THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY AND THE SCOPE OF IMMUNITY OF STATE 
OFFICIALS  
 
4.1.1 The Doctrine of Immunity 
 
One of the obstacles in prosecuting international crimes are the rules intended to protect the 
accused person by granting him or her immunity from prosecution.
221
 Two categories of 
immunities may come into play, namely; those under international law and those provided for 
in national legislation.
222
 However, this section of the paper will focus on the former category 
of immunities. As a starting point, the etymology of the word immunity comes from the Latin 
word immunitas, meaning „exempt from public service or charge‟.223 According to the 
Concise Law Dictionary: 
 
“An immunity is a right peculiar to some individual or body; an exemption from some 
general duty or burden; a personal benefit or favour granted by the law contrary to the 
general rule”.
224
  
 
Thus, immunity from prosecution means an exception to prosecution for crimes.
225
 
According to William Schabas, immunity is „a defence‟ under international criminal law.226  
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222
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It, therefore, constitutes a defence to international criminal responsibility in favour of 
individuals accused of international crimes.
227
 Immunity may be invoked at any time during 
the trial but before judgement is delivered.
228
 As a ground that excludes an individual‟s 
criminal responsibility, immunity „has the effect of rendering inadmissible any action brought 
against the person who invokes it‟.229 The issue then is whether or not the defence of 
immunity is enforceable under international law?  
 
4.1.2 Scope of immunity of state officials 
 
International law considers two aspects to state officials‟ immunity: functional immunity and 
personal immunity.
230
 Functional immunity, commonly referred to as immunity ratione 
materiae, applies on the strength of the so-called Act of State doctrine to the official acts of 
senior state officials.
231
 In principle the state is held responsible for any violations of 
international law that a state agent may have committed while acting in an official 
capacity.
232
 This type of immunity may be relied upon both by serving and former state 
officials for official acts while they were in office.
233
 
 
Personal immunity, commonly referred to as immunity ratione personae, is granted by 
international customary to a certain category of individuals and applies only for the term of 
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office of the individual.
234
 Moreover, it also applies to international crimes, as held by 
domestic courts in the cases involving Muammar Qaddafi
235
 and Robert Mugabe.
236
 There 
seems to be consensus in judicial opinion and state practice that a state official possessing 
immunity ratione personae may not be subject to the jurisdiction of domestic courts in 
foreign states for allegedly committing international crimes.
237
 
 
However, nowadays this position is no longer accepted under international law.
238
 John 
Dugard argues that “some human rights norms enjoy such a high status that their violations, 
even by state officials, constitute an international crime.”239 Therefore, according to Dugard 
the doctrine of immunity cannot be at odds with these developments.
240
  
 
4.2 THE IMMUNITY OF HEADS OF STATES   
 
The indictment of Al Bashir by the ICC is not an unprecedented move as he is the third head 
of state to be indicted by an international criminal court.
241
 Precedent includes the indictment 
issued by the ICTY against Slobodan Milosević while he was the President of the FRY, and 
those issued by the SCSL against Charles Taylor while he was President of Liberia. In the 
Taylor case the defence challenged the validity of the indictment by arguing that the SCSL 
                                                          
234
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was not truly an international criminal tribunal, and therefore, the personal immunities of 
head of state apply before it.
242
 In this regard, the SCSL settled the case by affirming that it is 
an international tribunal, and as such, it argued that these immunities do not apply before 
international criminal courts.
243
 However, in both these cases the custody of the accused was 
only secured after they had either been removed or had stepped down from power, therefore, 
at the time of their trials both Presidents were former heads of states. 
 
4.2.1 Personal immunities versus the Jurisdiction of international criminal courts 
 
Two questions arise in the Al Bashir case concerning the personal immunities of heads of 
states: (i) whether the ICC has violated Al Bashir‟s  personal immunities of Al Bashir as a 
serving heads of state? and (ii) whether ICC states parties are obliged to carry out the request 
for the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir? 
 
It has already been mentioned that customary international law accepts that state officials are 
not subject to the jurisdiction of foreign states concerning all crimes, including international 
crimes. This holds true for head of states because they fall under the protective shield of 
immunity ratione personae. Authoritatively for this position is found in the decision by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Arrest Warrant case.
244
 The ICJ held that when the 
Belgian court issued [emphasis] the arrest warrant against the Minister of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo on charges of international crimes committed in the DRC, it violated the 
personal immunities enjoyed by the Minister.
245
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Interestingly, the ICJ held that Belgium had breached the international rules by merely 
“circulating internationally” the arrest warrants.246 The Court held that the Minister‟s 
immunity applies before national courts for international crimes.
247
 It acknowledged that this 
immunity would not apply: (i) once the Minister was no longer in office, (ii) to acts 
committed in the Minister‟s private capacity, and (iii) before international tribunals such as 
the ICC, ICTY and the ICTR.
248
   
 
This decision has been strongly criticized „as a setback for the movement against impunity 
for the commission of international crimes.‟249 Akande suggests that one should not read too 
much into the decision of the ICJ, as its argument that „international law immunities only 
apply before national courts and not before international tribunals is unpersuasive.‟250 In this 
regard the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY addressed the issue in the Blaškić case, by 
recognising that in certain circumstance, international law immunities may be pleaded before 
an international tribunal.
251
 Although the Chamber was referring to the immunity of state 
officials from producing documents, it nevertheless, accepted that state officials can be 
immune from the jurisdiction of international tribunals.
252
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Commentators agree that the merely accepting the view that international law immunities do 
not apply before international courts and tribunals oversimplifies the matter.
253
 The reliance 
upon international law immunities before international criminal tribunals should rather 
depend upon: (i) whether the instruments conferring jurisdiction on the tribunal expressly or 
implicitly remove the immunity of state officials, and (ii) whether the state concerned is 
bound by the instrument which removes the immunity.
254
  
 
4.2.2 Immunity before the ICC 
 
As already mention above that the question of whether or not international law immunities 
are available before the ICC will depend on examining the text of the ICC Statute. Article 27 
states the following: 
 
“1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no 
case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of 
itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentences. 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a 
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such person.” 
 
 
At least four elements may be considered in analysing and interpreting Article 27(1). First, 
the expression of equal application “to all persons” manifests that all [emphasis] individuals 
who commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court will be responsible and liable for 
                                                          
253
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punishment.
255
 The reference to “equally”, in paragraph 1, clearly refers to a “distinction 
based on official capacity” only.256 Secondly, the expression “official capacity”, in paragraph 
1, is used to describe a broad concept by using non-exhaustive examples.
257
 These are the 
most typical examples of individuals with political and administrative power who might be 
tempted to claim immunity from criminal responsibility and hide behind positions in their 
endeavours to attain impunity.
258
 Thirdly, the very strict wording of the formula “shall in no 
case exempt…” have the procedural consequence that the Court does not have to make a 
finding on the facts concerning the position held by the accused at the time when he or she 
committed the crime.
259
 Therefore, even if the accused held a position or purported to act in 
an official capacity it would not exempt criminal responsibility.
260
 Finally, the wording of the 
formula “in and of itself [is not a] “ground for reduction of sentence” clearly indicates that no 
mitigation is permitted just because the accused acted or believed that he/she was acting in 
their official capacity.
261
 However, the possibility for a reduction of sentence, according to 
Article 78(1), is equally available to accused who commit crimes while acting in an official 
capacity as to all other perpetrators.
262
 
 
Eric David observes that the ICC Statute dismisses two radically different defences.
263
 The 
first objection is based on the merits, Article 27(1), while the second objection is based on 
procedural grounds, Article 27(2), and it expressly bars both.
264
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Similar provisions of Article 27(1) are reflected in the agreements of the Nuremberg
265
 and 
Tokyo
266
 Tribunals, the Nuremberg Principles,
267
 and the statutes of the ICTY
268
and ICTR.
269
 
The main effect of these provisions is that it eliminates the substantive defence that may be 
raised by state officials.
270
 On the other hand, the provision of Article 27(2) has no 
counterpart in the founding instruments of international tribunals.
271
 The provision 
establishes that state officials are subject to prosecution by the ICC thereby constituting a 
waiver by states parties of any immunity that their officials would ordinarily possess before 
the ICC.
272
  
 
In summary, the provisions of Article 27 merely reiterate the prevailing principle of 
customary international law, namely; that the personal immunities are irrelevant before 
international criminal courts. One could agree that in the Al Bashir case the Pre-Trial 
Chamber I recognised this fact by stating “that the current position Omar of Al Bashir as 
Head of State which is not party to the [ICC] Statute has no effect on the Court‟s 
jurisdiction…”273 However, this amputation of immunity by Article 27 does not bring closure 
to the problem because the ICC relies upon states to arrest and surrender wanted persons. 
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4.3 OBLIGATIONS UPON STATES TO ARREST AND SURRENDER AL BASHIR  
 
An issue of more practical difficulty is whether states may lawfully ignore Al Bashir‟s 
personal immunities in order to comply with the request of the ICC?  Paola Gaeta address this 
issue by stating that: 
 
 “[T]o assert that an international criminal court can “lawfully” issue and circulate an arrest 
warrant against individuals entitled to personal immunity before national courts, is not 
tantamount to saying that states can “lawfully” arrest those individuals and surrender them to 
the requesting international court.”274   
 
 
4.3.1 Article 98(1) of the ICC Statute  
 
We now know that the ICC is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-party 
states yet the ICC Statute does not remove the immunities ordinarily enjoyed by officials of 
non-parties. Because the ICC is deprived of enforcement powers it relies upon states to 
enforce and implement its warrants of arrest.
275
 In general, states parties are obliged to co-
operate with a request from the ICC for the arrest and surrender of a person on their territory, 
in terms of Article 86 of the ICC Statute. The subsequent provisions Part IX of the ICC 
Statute set out this obligation in more detail. However, the Court‟s request for co-operation is 
limited by Article 98(1), which states the following: 
 
“The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require 
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with 
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless 
the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State.” 
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Commentators note that in essence this limitation obliges the Court to not put [the requested] 
state in a position of violating its international obligations where immunities are concerned
276
 
Consequently, the ICC must first seek the co-operation and waiver of immunity from the 
third state before issuing its request to states.
277
 
 
At face value there seems to be tension between Article 27, which renders international 
immunities irrelevant for ICC‟s exercise of jurisdiction, and Article 98, which bars the Court 
from proceeding with a request for surrender in respect of persons entitled to international 
immunities.
278
 The tension between these two provisions depends upon the interpretation of 
the words “third states” in Article 98(1). A grammatical interpretation of the words “third 
states” may mean a state other than the requested state.279 Kreß and Prost are in favour of this 
interpretation.
280
 Their argument is that if the drafters of the ICC Statute intended for the 
words in Article 98(1) to refer to a “non-party state” they would have done so, as they did in 
other provisions of Part IX (in particular Article 87(5)) which explicitly speak of “a State not 
party to the Statute”.281 
 
A narrow interpretation of the words “third states” may mean a non-party state of the ICC 
Statute as taken by a number of scholars
282
 and by some ICC states parties.
283
 Reliance upon 
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this interpretation would mean that a waiver of immunity would be a precondition in order to 
execute a request for surrender.
284
 In contrast, such a waiver is not necessary between a 
requested state party and other states parties because Article 27(2) removes the hurdle of 
international immunities from preventing the ICC in exercising jurisdiction or issuing arrest 
warrants.
285
  
 
 
4.3.2 May the ICC lawfully request for the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir from State 
Parties? 
 
The legal issue is whether the ICC‟s request for surrender amounts to an ultra vires act? If 
one accepts the above narrow construction then indeed the Court‟s request is ultra vires, in 
that it is in conflict with Article 98(1). As the President of Sudan, Al Bashir‟s immunity 
ratione personae, applies in relation to all states. The basis for contending that the ICC 
request is ultra vires is that the Court has not fulfilled the precondition required by its Statute, 
namely; that of obtaining a waiver of immunity from the Sudanese government before it goes 
ahead in issuing a request for surrender from its states parties. It is against this backdrop that 
states parties may lawfully elect not to comply with the ICC‟s request.286 
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4.3.3 Would a state commit a wrongful act against Sudan surrendering Al Bashir to the 
ICC? 
 
States parties may choose to carry out the ICC‟s request although they are not obliged to do 
so, against the above contention. One may recall that SC‟s resolution, referring the situation 
in Darfur, only urged [emphasis] states to fully co-operate with the ICC.
287
 In this regard, one 
view is that a state could execute the Court‟s request based on being a member of the UN, 
and as such it would be performing an action urged by the SC.
288
 Such a state could claim 
that it does not incur responsibility against Sudan for deciding to carry out a recommendation 
by the SC.
289
 
 
One may agree with Gaeta‟s two-fold argument against this legal construction.290 First, the 
co-operation by states with the ICC is limited in that it must comply with the ICC Statute, put 
differently, the SC resolution has not given the ICC a blank cheque: in that did not authorise 
the ICC to issue requests to non-party states.
291
 Secondly, the SC did not urge states to ignore 
international immunities when co-operating with the ICC.
292
 
 
The Registrar of the ICC, at the request of the Pre-Trial Chamber I, has issued two requests 
seeking co-operation from all states parties of the ICC to arrest and surrender Al Bashir.
293
 
Since the issuance of arrest warrants by the ICC, Al Bashir has been invited to visit several 
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countries, including Uganda,
294
 Nigeria,
295
 Turkey,
296
 Denmark
297
 and South Africa.
298
 Max 
du Plessis opines that Al Bashir avoided travelling to these states for fear of arrest or perhaps 
so that these states could avoid diplomatic embarrassment.
299
 More interestingly, President Al 
Bashir has visited Egypt,
300
 Kenya,
301
 Djibouti
302
 and has made two visits to Chad.
303
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Although three of the countries (excluding Egypt) which Al Bashir has visited are states 
parties to the ICC Statute,
304
 none of them has co-operated with the ICC in arresting and 
surrendering the incumbent head of state of Sudan to the Court.
305
 
 
In conclusion, although the SC has requested all states to co-operate with the ICC, its request 
cannot be construed to imply that states are legalised in breaching the rules of customary 
international law on personal immunities of a head of state, such as Al Bashir, without 
incurring any international responsibility for such a breach.
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The purpose of this research has been to address the question of whether state officials, 
particularly a serving head of state, may be held responsibly before an international forum for 
international crimes committed while in office? This question is reflected in the long standing 
debate regarding the tension between the protection of human rights and the demands for 
state sovereignty.
307
 However, the drafters of the ICC Statute have made clear that their aims 
were “that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must 
not go unpunished”308 and “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes…”309 The concept of punishing individuals for transgressing international criminal 
law can be traced to the well-known judgement of the International Military Tribunal where it 
stated that: 
 
“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only 
by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 
be enforced.”310 
 
In criminal cases when it is alleged that international crimes have been committed, the rules 
of international law regarding immunity strike a balance between the need to avoid undue 
interference with the functioning of foreign states and the need to punish perpetrators for 
international crimes.
311
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Evidently, the ICC Statute has gone beyond the developments of customary international law. 
As discussed earlier in chapter three, the ICC is in line with the precedence of the other 
international criminal tribunals in asserting that nationals of non-party states may be subject 
to its jurisdiction, subject to relevant limitations.  
 
With regard to the immunity of a serving head of state from prosecution by the ICC for 
committing international crimes, one would agree with the author that issuance of arrest 
warrants against Al Bashir is a hallmark event in the Courts dispensation.  One of the 
concerns about the case against Al Bashir is that it arises out of a SC referral regardless of the 
fact that Sudan is not a party to the ICC Statute. However, this issue can be dispensed of it by 
accepting that SC has the competence of removing Al Bashir‟s immunity when exercising its 
power under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The legal basis for removing his immunity is 
anchored on the Sudan state being a party to the UN Charter, and therefore, having accepted 
the binding power of the SC.
312
 
 
Has the ICC ousted the immunity enjoyed by Al Bashir under international law as an 
incumbent head of state? There is strong academic support which responds in the affirmative 
to this question. First, whenever the SC refers a situation to the ICC, the ICC Statute is 
binding upon the state concerned as if it were a party to Statute.
313
 Secondly,  SC resolution 
1593 (paragraph 2) implicitly binding upon Sudan in that it must co-operate with the ICC, 
hence, this puts Sudan in an parallel position to an ICC state party to accept the provisions of 
the Statute.
314
 It is against this back-drop that the immunity enjoyed Al Bashir is lifted by 
Article 27.
315
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Finally, where a charge of genocide is brought, against an accused, before the ICC (as Al 
Bashir is), the Genocide Convention of 1948
316
 lifts immunities.
317
 Important provisions of 
the Genocide Convention are: Article 4 which provides for the punishment of persons who 
commit genocide even if they are constitutionally responsible rulers, and Article 6 which 
provides the prosecution of such persons either before the national courts where the genocide 
took place or before an international criminal tribunal in respect to which the state has 
accepted jurisdiction. The ICJ held, in the Genocide Convention case
318
 that the ICTY fell 
within the scope of Article 6 because of the obligations accepted under the UN Charter.
319
 
This argument could also be applied in support of the ICC in cases concerning a referral of a 
situation by the SC to the Court.
320
 
 
While these academic arguments suggest that the ICC Statute has removed Al Bashir‟s 
immunity, the ICC has not yet made a pronouncement on the relationship concerning Articles 
27 and 98 and their effects for non-party states.
321
 These issues will perhaps be addressed 
before the ICC in the appeals proceedings concerning the decision to issue arrests warrants 
against Al Bashir by the Sudanese President himself, other African states, and the AU in 
terms of Article 82(1) of the ICC Statute.
322
  
 
One cannot conceive that Al Bashir would voluntarily surrender himself to the ICC nor that 
the Sudanese government will waiver the President‟s immunity so as to allow the ICC to 
exercise its jurisdiction over him. To this end, ICC state parties may choose to arrest and 
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surrender Al Bashir to the ICC at the cost of breaching their obligations under international 
law. However, the ICC‟s jurisdiction will not be affected by the illegality of the arrest 
because the Court is not bound to respect any head of state‟s immunities.323 This situation is 
highly unimaginable because before travelling to other states Al Bashir will definitely 
establish some guarantees that that state will not surrender him to the ICC, as illustrated in 
chapter four. The lack of efforts to bring Al Bashir to justice before the ICC cannot be 
isolated from the political debate  that “the ICC is rapidly turning into a Western court to try 
African…governments”324 At the time of writing, the ICC has launched its investigations 
against six African countries, two of which concern serving heads of states.
325
 In sum, one 
can only be optimistic that in the future the ICC will undertake prosecutions of international 
crimes committed not only by nationals of non-party states but also nationals of powerful 
state, including their head of states who enjoy immunities under international law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORD COUNT: 17 981 (excluding contents page and list of references). 
                                                          
323
 Gaeta P (2009) „Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest‟ 332. 
324
 See, Mahmood Mamdani quoted in Du Plessis M „The International Criminal Court that Africa Wants‟ 
(2010) 20. 
325
 See, ICC Situations and Cases, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ 
[accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
LIST OF REFERRENCES 
 
1. PRIMARY SCOURCES        
1.1 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND PROTOCOLS 
 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948. 
 
Protocol between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the 
Justice and Equality Movement on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur in 
accordance with the N‟djamena Agreement, Abuja, 9 November 2004. 
 
Protocol between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the 
Justice and Equality Movement on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, 
Abuja, 9 November 2004. 
 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc 
A/CONF 183/9, 12 July 1998. 
 
The Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone of 16 January 2002. 
 
The Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 2945. 
 
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter), agreed upon in 
pursuance to the London Agreement on 8 August 1945. 
 
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Charter), a 
directive from the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces, Douglas MacArthur issued on 19 
January 1946. 
 
UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1315 (2000), 14 August 2000. 
 
UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1556 (2004), 30 July 2004. 
 
UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1564 (2004), 18 September 2004. 
 
UN Security Council Resolution S/Res/1593 (2005), 31 March 2005.  
 
UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/827 (1993), 25 May 1993. 
 
UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/955 (1994), 8 November 1994. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
1.2 CASES  
International Criminal Court 
Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717 
(30 September 2008). 
 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (29 January 
2007). 
 
Public redacted version of the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, ICC-02/05-157-
AnxA (14 July 2008). 
 
The Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad All Abd-Al-Rahman, Case 
No. ICC-02/05-01/07 (27 April 2007). 
 
The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1, „Decision 
on the Prosecutor‟s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir‟ (4 March 2009). 
 
The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, „Decision 
on the Prosecutor‟s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir‟ (4 March 2009) 
 
The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-95, „Decision 
on the Prosecutor‟s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir‟ (12 July 2010). 
 
The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-12, 
Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application 
for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir” (10 March 2009). 
 
The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-21, Decision 
on the Prosecutor's Application for Leave to Appeal the "Decision on the Prosecution's 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir" (24 June 2009). 
 
The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-73, Judgment 
on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir" (3 February 2010). 
 
The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-95, Second 
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (12 July 2010). 
 
The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-94, Second 
Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest (12 July 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
International Military Tribunal 
 
International Military Tribunal judgement of 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German Major 
Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, 
Germany, Part 2 (1950). 
 
 
International Court of Justice 
 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) 2002 ICJ Report 
3; 41 ILM 536. 
 
Case Concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of Congo v France) 
Provisional Measures Order of 17 June 2003, ICJ Report (2003). 
 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
 
Prosecutor v Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR 108 bis, Objection to Issue of Subpoena duces 
tecum, (29 October 1997), 110 ILR 609, 707. 
 
Prosecutor v Miolsević, Milutinović, Sainović, Ojdanić & Stojilikovi, Case No. IT-99-37-I, 29 
June 2001. 
 
Prosecutor v Milutinović, Ojdanić, Sainović, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, 6 May 2003. 
 
 
 
Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I-001, 7 March 2003. 
 
Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Appeals Chamber 
Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Taylor (31 May 2004). 
 
 
National Courts 
 
French Cour de Cassation 13 March 2001 Judgement 1414 (2001) 105 Revne Generale de 
Droit International Public 437. 
 
Tachiona v Mugabe 169 F Supp 2d 259, 309 (SNDY 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
1.3 INTERNATIONAL REPORTS  
 
African Union, Peace and Security Council (2008) Communiqué of the 142
nd
 Meeting, 
PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII). 
 
African Union, Peace and Security Council (2008) Communiqué of the 151
st
 Meeting, 
PSC/MIN/Comm.1(CLI). 
 
African Union, Peace and Security Council Fifth Session (2004) „Report of the Chairperson 
of the Commission on the Situation in the Sudan‟. 
 
Amnesty International Report (2003) „Sudan: Empty Promises? Human Rights Violations in 
Government-Controlled Areas‟ African Report No. 54/036/2003. 
 
Ekengard A (2008) „The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons 
Learned‟ FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency Report. 
 
Human Rights Watch (2004) „Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and 
Militia Forces in Western Sudan‟ Vol 16, No. 6 (a). 
 
Human Rights Watch (2004) „Sudan, Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in western Sudan‟, Vol. 
16, No. 5 (a). 
 
International Crises Group Africa (2003) „Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace‟, ICG 
African Report No. 73. 
 
International Crisis Group (2004) „Darfur Rising: Sudan‟s New Crisis‟, ICG African Report 
No. 76. 
 
International Crisis Group (2004) „Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur‟, ICG African Report No. 
80. 
 
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General, 25 January 2005. 
 
Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (continued) 
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court PCNICC/2001/1/Add1 (2002). 
 
Smith J and Walker B „Darfur: Management of a Genocidal Crisis‟ (2004) AEGIS Report 
201/04. 
 
Sudanese Human Rights Organisation „Report on the situation of Human Rights in Sudan, 1 
October 2003 – 31 January 2004‟ (2004). 
 
United Nations Development Programme‟s Human Development Index 2010 – 20th 
Anniversary Edition „The Real Wealth of Nations Pathways to Human Development‟. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
2. SECONDARY SCOURCES        
2.1 BOOKS 
Aiyar P R (2005) Concise Law Dictionary: With legal maxims, Latin terms and words and 
phrases (3ed.) Wadhwa and Co. Nagpur. 
 
Ali T & Matthews R (1999) „Civil War and Efforts in Sudan‟ in Ali T & Matthews R Civil 
Wars in Africa McGill-Queens University Press: Montreal. 
 
Beshir M O (1975) The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace C. Hurst & Co. Ltd: 
London. 
 
Broomhall B (2003) International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between 
Sovereignty and the Rule of Law Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
 
Burr J M & Collins R O (2008) Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster (2ed.) Markus Wiener 
Publishers: Princeton. 
 
Cassese A (2008) International Criminal Law (2ed.) Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
 
Collins R D (2008) A History of Modern Sudan Cambridge University Press: United 
Kingdom. 
 
David E „Official Capacity and Immunity of an Accused before the International Criminal 
Court‟ in Doria J, Gasser H P & Bassiouni M C (eds.) The Legal Regime of the International 
Criminal Court (2009) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden, Boston. 
 
Deng F M (1995) War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan Brookings Institution 
Press: Washington D.C. 
 
Dugard J (2005) International Law: A South African Perspective (3ed.) Juta: Landsowne. 
 
Gaeta P „Official Capacities and Immunity‟ in Cassese A, Gaeta P & Jones J R W D (eds.) 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Vol. 2 (2002) Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
 
Holmes J T „Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC‟ in Cassese A, Gaeta P, Jones 
J R W D (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Vol. 1 (2001) Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
 
Johnson D H (1991) „North-South Issues‟ in Woodward P (ed.) Sudan after Nimeiri 
Routledge: Oxon. 
 
Johnson D H (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars Indiana University Press: 
Canada and United States. 
 
Kabalo S A (1988) „Economic Crisis and The Civilian, Military Interchange in The Sudan‟ in 
Mahmoud F B (ed.) Calamity in Sudan: Civilian Versus Military Rule Institute for African 
Alternatives: London. 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
Kreß C and Prost K „Article 98‟ in Triffterer O (ed.) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 2ed. (2008) Verlag C. H. 
Beck oHG: München. 
 
Mamdani M (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror Human 
Sciences Research Council Press: Cape Town. 
 
Mansour K (1990) The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan’s Political 
Evolution Kegan Paul International: London. 
 
McGoldrick D „Criminal Trials before International Tribunals: Legality and Legitimacy‟ in 
McGoldrick D, Rowe P, Donnelly E (eds.) The Permanent International Criminal Court 
(2004) Hart Publishing: USA. 
 
Murungu C „Immunity of State Officials and the Prosecution of International Crimes‟ in 
Murungu C & Biegon J (eds.) Prosecution International Crimes in Africa (2011) Pretoria 
University Law Press: South Africa. 
 
Niblock T (1987) Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985 
State University of New York Press: Albany. 
 
Prost K and Schlunck A „Article 98‟ in Triffterer O (ed.) Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (1999) Verlag C. H. 
Beck oHG: München. 
 
Rone J (2003) Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights Human Rights Watch: Brussels, London, New 
York, and Washington D.C. 
 
Sarooshi D (2000) The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The 
Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
 
Sarooshi D „The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court and the UN 
Security Council‟ in McGoldrick D, Rowe, Donnelly (eds.) The Permanent International 
Criminal Court (2004) Hart Publishing: USA. 
 
Schabas W A (2007) An Introduction to International Criminal Law Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge. 
 
Sharif H (1994) „Re-Cycling the Past in the Sudan: An Overview of Political Decay‟ in 
Sharif H & Terje T (eds.) Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet: Uppsala. 
 
Sidahmed A S & Sidahmed A (2005) Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East  
RoutledgeCuurzon: Oxon. 
 
Simma B (2002) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2ed.) Oxford University 
Press: Oxford. 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
Triffterer O „Article 27‟ in Triffterer O (ed.) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2008) Verlag C. H. Beck 
oHG: München. 
 
Werle G (2009) Principles of International Criminal Law (2ed.) T-M-C Asser Press: The 
Hague. 
 
Woorward P (2003) The Horn of Africa: Political and International Relations I.B. Tauris & 
Co. Ltd: London and New York. 
 
White N and Cryer R „The ICC and the Security Council: An Uncomfortable Relationship‟ in 
Doria J, Gasser H P, Bassiouni C (eds.) The Legal Regime of the International Criminal 
Court (2009) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden. 
 
 
 
2.2 ARTICLES 
Akande D (2004) „International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court‟ Vol. 
98 No. 3 American Journal of International Law 407-433. 
 
Akande D (2003) „The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nations of Non-
Parties: Legal Basis and Limitations‟ Vol. 1 Issue 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
618-650. 
 
Arsanjani M (1999) „The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court‟ 93 American 
Journal of International Law 22-43. 
 
Cryer R (1998) „Commentary on the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court: A 
Cadenza for the Song of the Who Died in Vain?‟ Vol. 3 No. 2 Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law 271-286. 
 
Crook J R (2005) „U.S. Proposes New Regional Court to Hear Charges Involving Darfur, 
Others Urge ICC‟ Vol. 99 No. 2 The American Journal of International Law 501-502. 
 
Gaeta P (2009) „Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest‟ 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 315-332. 
 
Gosnell C (2008) „The Request for an Arrest Warrant in Al Bashir: Idealistic Posturing of 
Calculated Plan?‟ 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 841-851. 
 
Gresh A (1989) „The Officers and the Comrades: The Sudanese Communist Party and 
Nimeiri Face-to-Face, 1969-1971‟ 21 International Journal of Middle East Studies 393-409. 
 
Morris M (2001) „High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States‟ Vol. 64 
No. 1 Law & Contemporary Problems 13-66. 
 
Oette L (2010) „Peace and Justice, or Neither? The Repercussions of the al-Bashir Case for 
International Criminal Justice in Africa and Beyond‟ Vol. 8 No. 2 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 345-364. 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
 
Sarooshi D (1996) „The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs‟ 
Vol. 67 No. 1 British Yearbook of International Law 418-478. 
 
Scharf M (2001) „The ICC‟s Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critiques of 
the U.S. Position‟ 64 Law & Contemporary Problems 67-117. 
 
Scheffer D (1999) „The United States and the International Criminal Court‟ Vol. 93 No. 1 
The American Journal of International Law 12-22.   
 
 
Van der Vyver J D (2010) „Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir‟ Vol. 104 No. 3 
American Journal of International Law 461-467. 
    
 
 
2.3  PAPERS AND MONOGRAPHS  
Akande D „The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of State Immune from ICC 
Prosecution?‟ (2008) Oxford Transitional Justice Research Collected Essays, 2008-2010. 
 
Bamu P „Head of State Immunity and the ICC: Can Bashir be Prosecuted?‟ (2008) Oxford 
Transitional Justice Research Collected Essays, 2008-2010. 
 
Du Plessis M „The International Criminal Court that Africa Wants‟ (2010) Institute for 
Security Studies Monograph 172. 
 
Field S „The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry’ (2000) Institute for Global 
Dialogue Occasional Paper No. 23. 
 
O‟Neill G W and Cassis V ‘Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and 
Shortcomimgs of the African Union in Darfur‟ (2005) University of Bern Project on Internal 
Displacement Occasional Paper. 
 
Oola S „Bashir and the ICC: The Aura or Audition of the International Justice in Africa?‟ 
(2008) Oxford Transitional Justice Research Collected Essays, 2008-2010. 
     
 
Melville D „Restoring Peace and Democracy in Sudan: Limited Choices for African 
Leadership‟ (2002) Institute for Global Dialogue Occasional Paper No. 34. 
 
Salih M A M „Understanding the Conflict in Darfur‟ (2005) University of Copenhagen 
Centre for African Studies Occasional Paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
2.4 PRESS RELEASES 
 
Press Release, Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, 
ICC-CPI-20041004-78 (2004). 
 
Press Release, Commentary by SLM/A (2003).  
 
Press Release, Pre-Trial Chamber I receives documents containing list of evidence in the 
situation in Darfur, ICC-CPI_20070227-207 (2005). 
  
Press Release, Secretary-General Establishes International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur 
SG/A/890 (2004). 
 
Press Release, Secretary-General Welcomes Adoption of Security Council Resolution 
Referring Situation in Darfur, Sudan, To International Criminal Court Prosecutor, 
SG/SM/9797AFR/1123 (2005). 
 
Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of 
International Criminal Court SC/8351 (2005). 
 
Press Release, The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigation in Darfur, ICC-OTP-0606-104 
(2005). 
 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations Press Release No. 061(05) „Explanation of Vote by 
Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Acting U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on the 
Sudan Accountability Resolution, in the Security Council‟ (2005). 
 
 
2.5 NEWS PAPERS 
 
Bell G „South Africa may arrest Bashir if attends World Cup‟ Reuters, 28 May 2010, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/28/us-soccer-world-bashir-
idUSTRE64R3KH20100528 [accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
 
 
Hoge W „U.S. Lobbies U.N on Darfur and International Court‟ New York Times, 29 January 
2005 at A5, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C06E6D9143BF93AA15752C0A9639C8B
63 [accessed on 18 September 2011]. 
 
Lynch C „U.S., Europe Debate Venue for Darfur Trials, E.U. Wants ICC to Try War Crimes 
Cases‟ Washington Post, 21 January 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A24673-2005Jan20.html [accessed 18 September 2011]. 
 
Menya W „Bashir surprise guest in Kenya‟ Daily Nation, 27 August 2010, available at 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Bashir%20surprise%20guest%20in%20Kenya/-
/1056/998008/-/w03i5sz/-/index.html [accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Reuters „Sudanese President Vows to Defy U.N. Vote‟ Washington Post, 3 April 2005, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22014-2005Apr2.html 
[accessed on 18 September 2011]. 
 
Sapa „Uganda cautions al-Bashir over Kampala trip‟ Mail and Guardian, 16 July 2009, 
available at http://mg.co.za/article/2009-07-16-uganda-cautions-albashir-over-kampala-trip 
[accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
 
 
William W „Black Book History‟ Sudan Tribune: The Financial Times, 21 August 2004,  
available at http://www.sudantribune.com/The-Black-Book-history-or-Darfur-s,4868 
[accessed on 11 July 2011]. 
 
 
 
2.6 WEBSITE MATERIAL   
All Situations, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/ [accessed on 25 October 2011]. 
 
Amnesty International, Nigerian government must arrest Sudanese President during visit, 23 
October 2009, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/nigerian-
government-must-arrest-sudanese-president-during-visit-20091023 [accessed on 7 October 
2011].   
 
Amnesty International, Turkey: No to safe haven for fugitive from international justice, 6 
November 2009, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/turkey-no-
safe-haven-fugitive-international-justice-20091106 [accessed on 7 October 2011].  
 
Amnesty International, Danish government must arrest Sudanese President if he attends 
climate conference, 20 November 2009, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-
updates/news/danish-government-must-arrest-sudanese-president-if-he-attends-climate-
conferenc [accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
 
Amnesty International, Al-Bashir visit to Egypt is a missed opportunity to enforce justice, 25 
March 2009, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/al-bashir-visit-
egypt-missed-opportunity-enforce-justice-20090325 [accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
 
Amnesty International, Chad must arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during visit, 21 
July 2010, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/chad-must-arrest-
sudanese-president-omar-al-bashir-during-visit-2010-07-21 [accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
 
Dagne T „Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement‟ 
(2010), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142668.pdf [accessed on 5 
June 20111]. 
 
Darfur Humanitarian Profile, No 8 (2004), available at http://unsudanig.org [accessed on 13 
July 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
Deteriorating Security Threats to Plunge Darfur into „Chaos‟, under UN Secretary-General 
(OCHA) available at 
http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1088217 [accessed on 11 
July 2011]. 
 
English-Word Information, available at http://wordinfo.info/unit/4072/ip:9/il:M [accessed on 
29 September 2011]. 
 
El-Battahani A „A Complex Web: Politics and Conflict in Sudan‟ (2006), available at 
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/politics-conflict.php  [accessed on 5 June 2011]. 
 
 
Genocide Watch „Genocide Emergency: Darfur, Sudan‟ (2004), available at 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/12waystodenygenocide.html [accessed on 1 
August 2011]. 
 
Global Security Website „Sudan: First Civil War‟, available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm [accessed on 5 June 
2011]. 
 
Ibrahim F „Ideas on the Background of the Present Conflict in Darfur‟ (2004), available at 
http://www.afrikafreundeskreis.de/docs/darfur_prof_ibrahim_5_04.pdf [accessed on 10 July 
2011]. 
 
ICC Situations and Cases, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ [accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
 
International Crisis Group ‟Sudan‟s Other Wars‟ (2003), available at 
http://www.thenubian.net/ICG_Nubian_5062003.pdf [accessed 13 July 2011]. 
 
National Council of Churches „The 2004 Unity Statement and Call to Action‟ available at 
www.nccusa.org/news/04savedarfur-coalition.html [accessed on 13 July 2011]. 
 
Public Document ICC-02/05-01/09-7, Request to all States Parties to the Rome Statute for the 
arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 6 March 2009, available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc642283.pdf [accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
 
Public Document ICC-02/05-01/09-96, Supplementary request to all States Parties to the 
Rome Statute for the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 21 July 2011, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc910850.pd  [accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
 
 
 
Public Document ICC-02/05-01/09-129, Decision informing the United Nations Security 
Council and the Assembly of the States parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir‟s 
recent visit to Djibouti, 12 May 2011, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1057120.pd  [accessed on 7 October 2011].   
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
Public Document ICC-02/05-01/09-132, Decision requesting observation about Omar Al-
Bashir‟s recent visit to the Republic of Chad, 18 August 2011, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1206768.pdf [accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
 
Suliman M „Ethnicity from Perception to Cause of Violent Conflicts: The Case of the Fur and 
Nuba Conflicts in Western Sudan‟ (1997), available at 
http://www.ifaanet.org/ethnicity_inversion.htm [accessed on 10 July 2011]. 
 
Save Darfur Coalition, available at www.savedarfur.org/faith [accessed on 13 July 2011]. 
 
Save Darfur Coalition „Unity Statement‟ available at 
www.savedarfur.org/pages/unity_statement [accessed on 13 July 2011]. 
 
Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0205/ [accessed on 28 
July 2011]. 
 
The States Parties to the Rome Statute, available at 
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ [accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees „The Darfur Crisis and Chad Mediation‟, 
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=MEDIA&401159eca&page=publ [accessed on 13 July 
2011]. 
 
United States‟ State Department Fact Sheet on the International Criminal Court, available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/wci/rls/fs/2002/9978.htm [accessed on 18 September 2011]. 
 
U.S. State Department „Press Statement‟ (2002), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/7348.htm [accessed 19 September 2011]. 
 
United Nations Mission in the Sudan „Independence of South Sudan‟ available at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/referendum.shtml [accessed on 5 August 
2011]. 
 
World Health Organisation „Retrospective Mortality Survey: Among the Internally Displaced 
Population, Greater Darfur Sudan‟ (2005), available at 
http://www.emro.who.int/sudan/pdf/CMS%20Darfur%202005%20final%20report_11%2010
%2005.pdf [accessed on 11 July 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
